The investigation, based on several leaked internal documents published in a Financial Times investigation, found that A7 relied on a network of front companies and forged trade paperwork to access the Swift messaging system, routing payments through banks in Hong Kong, the UAE, Europe, and elsewhere despite sanctions.
How the scheme operated
A7 was established in late 2024 by Ilan Shor, a businessperson based in Moldova who is under EU and UK sanctions, with backing from Promsvyazbank, a Russia-based state-owned bank with ties to the country's defence sector. The company has positioned itself as an alternative to Western-dominated payments infrastructure, which Russian banks lost access to after 2022.
According to the leaked documents, A7 used more than 100 front companies, including entities registered in the UAE, Hong Kong, Kyrgyzstan, and Indonesia, to deposit funds into the banking system on behalf of Russian clients. To pass anti-money laundering checks, staff produced forged invoices, replaced sanctioned customs codes with unrestricted alternatives, and used a library of counterfeit corporate stamps to disguise the origin and purpose of transactions.
Scale of transactions across banks
According to the announcement, between late 2024 and August 2025, accounts linked to A7 at Standard Chartered's Hong Kong operations received USD 1.1 billion, while DBS Bank in Hong Kong processed USD 273 million, and Citigroup clients received USD 74 million. Deutsche Bank clients in Europe received about USD 18 million. First Abu Dhabi Bank, a major UAE bank, held accounts for 17 A7-linked entities that made more than USD 1.8 billion in outbound payments.
Just over half of the flows identified in the leak ultimately reached accounts at Chinese banks. The documents also reference A7-issued promissory notes with a face value exceeding USD 20 billion, as well as transfers of the dollar-pegged stablecoin Tether to Russian buyers.
Regulatory response and outlook
According to the announcement, A7 was placed under UK sanctions in May 2025. Standard Chartered raised concerns over payments routed through three Kyrgyz banks in February 2025 after detecting transactions split into smaller tranches, a pattern associated with efforts to avoid reporting thresholds. A7 subsequently shifted more of its activity toward banks in the UAE.
First Abu Dhabi Bank said it does not comment on specific client matters but confirmed that identified A7-linked accounts have been closed, adding that it applies sanctions frameworks from the US, the UK, the EU, and the UN. DBS Bank said it had no direct relationship with A7 and had taken action on the one account identified by the FT. Standard Chartered, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Deutsche Bank said they maintain strong anti-money laundering controls but declined to comment further. A7 and the Kyrgyz banks named in the report did not respond to requests for comment.
The findings point to continued exposure of correspondent banking relationships to sanctions-evasion schemes built on layered documentation and front companies, and are likely to increase scrutiny of due-diligence processes among banks handling cross-border payments connected to Russia.
