The report, titled ‘From Awareness to Action: What Quantum-Safe Readiness Requires Now’, was developed through EPAA’s Quantum Safe Cryptography Working Group. Its main argument is that payments organisations do not need to resolve every technical question or finish a full inventory of their cryptographic assets before acting.
Instead, the report recommends appointing an accountable executive and starting with a limited assessment of one important payment flow. Tracing that flow from initiation through clearing and settlement lets an organisation see where cryptography is in use, which data and systems require protection, and where progress depends on vendors, counterparties, or shared infrastructure.
Regulators set clearer expectations
The publication follows several moves by regulators in the region. In July 2026, the Monetary Authority of Singapore said it would issue formal supervisory expectations on quantum-safe readiness. In the same month, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s first Quantum Preparedness Index gave the local banking sector a score of 2.3 out of 10. Around half of authorised institutions had no structured plan for cryptographic upgrades.
EPAA’s own findings show a similar pattern. Only 20% of participants in its 2025 workshops described their senior stakeholders as very familiar with the quantum threat, even though they had chosen to attend a session on the subject. Camilla Bullock, CEO of EPAA, said awareness is rising across the industry, but ownership remains unclear. In Bullock’s view, the open question is now whether anyone has the mandate to begin.
Five actions within 90 days
The report sets out five steps for the next 90 days. First, organisations should name an accountable executive with enough authority to coordinate the work and bring decisions to the board. Second, they should run targeted discovery within a small number of high-value systems instead of waiting for an enterprise-wide inventory. Third, they should ask critical vendors for their post-quantum cryptography (PQC) plans, expected support dates, or any dependencies that could affect the organisation’s own timetable. Fourth, they should assess readiness across risk, governance, technology, organisational capability, and external dependencies. Finally, they should review contracts nearing renewal and reflect upon adding requirements for cryptographic agility and future migration support.
Anton Ruddenklau, Head of Financial Services Advisory at KPMG Singapore, pointed out that instead of technical training, boards need a named owner, a budget for the first assessment, and a date for a report back. Ruddenklau added that the institutions that are making progress in the region have treated quantum-safe readiness as a risk and governance programme, with technology teams contributing and not having to carry it alone.
Dependencies across the payments chain
The report also addresses gaps that no single organisation can close. Payment flows depend on identity systems, certificates, technology vendors, messaging networks, clearing and settlement infrastructure, and counterparties, all of which may move at different speeds. An organisation that has prepared its own systems may still be unable to migrate until others in the same flow align. For national payments infrastructure operators, the task therefore involves coordination as well as technology. Common technical requirements, testing and certification windows, coexistence arrangements, and minimum readiness milestones may be needed so that participants can migrate in phases without disrupting the wider system.
Differences between markets are another concern. Asia-Pacific jurisdictions may adopt different algorithms, regulatory requirements, or migration timetables. For cross-border payments, cryptographic agility may therefore mean supporting different standards in different markets, as well as adapting when standards change.